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Abstract Recent theoretical and philosophical movements within the study of
material culture are more carefully attending to the variety of ways in which human
artefacts, institutions, and cultural developments extend, shape and alter human
cognition over time. Material Engagement Theory (MET) in particular has set out to
map, explore and understand the relational nature of mind and material world as can
be read through cultural artefacts. Within the context of MET, the neurological
concept of metaplasticity has been expanded to include the affective domains of
technology, materials, and things in the neurological development and architecture
of the plastic human mind; a ‘transactional’ relationship between a plastic mind and
a plastic material world that are correlated at the ontological level. The challenges
of mapping this metaplasticity of mind lie in understanding how the mind and
material culture should be understood in relation to the constantly changing
lifeworlds of humans over time; the ecological, social, technological and environ-
mental contexts that form the historical specificity of cognitive development. This
paper explores how the historical specificity of metaplasticity can be made tangible
through the study of material culture, focusing upon the particular activity of oil
painting. It will be argued that paintings can provide clues to the historical speci-
ficity of the mind that crosses the lifeworld of human action; the technological,
phenomenological, philosophical, material, and social conditions underpinning the
creation of a painted mark. Drawing from a range of sources that have a root within
a Deleuzian process philosophy, the paper builds an account of painting that can be
read as expressing the encultured and historical manipulation of paint as an expres-
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1 Introduction
Recent developments within the study of material culture have focused attention upon
the efficacy of things in the ongoing development of human institutions, recasting the
reach, architecture, and development of human cognition across all domains of material
culture. Within pre-history, Shryock and Smail (2011) recognise the Blong reach of the
nervous system^ (pp. 62–65), taking cues from contemporary neuroscience, that
extends beyond the body and into the domains of cultural artefacts, regimes, and
practices as a neurological prosthesis, writing themselves upon the plastic phenotypical
and cognitive developments of the body. They cite the thirteenth century Ebstorf
mappa mundi — portraying the world as one vast body of Christ with hands, head
and feet at the extremities of the map itself comprised of settlements rivers, walls, and
beasts— as more than just a metaphor, rather as a neurologically accurate description
of the human body as a vastly interconnected nervous system (p. 64). Providing
examples of how the use of tools and technologies such as language, the exchange of
goods, migratory practices, as well as ecosystems and dietary habits alter the pheno-
typical development of the human body over time, they recognise that the body is
something that is written by history; by regimes of labour, diet and tools, but also by
letters, sounds and images.
This long-reach of the nervous system draws our attention to how more than just
evolving (in a strict Darwinian sense) we alter our own developmental pathways by
making and changing the very material means by which we engage the world over
time. Within Cognitive Archaeology, Malafouris (2015) has noted that through the
design, use and redevelopment of technologies, tools, infrastructures, practices, and
ideas we create things that alter the ecology of the human mind – reconfiguring the
architecture and boundaries of human thinking and the ways we understand and make
sense of the world. We, as Malafouris (2015) recognizes, create new things, embodied
situated practices and institutions which in turn expand the architecture of our minds
and ourselves. In recognizing more fully this openness of the human mind to a creative
model of evolution, Malafouris proposes more of a sustained focus upon the Bongoing
relational transaction^ between brain, body and world within which evolutionary
trajectories are recognized as shaped as much by human activity as they are by
traditional Darwinian processes of natural selection.
Recognising that the minds inherent plasticity has a reciprocal openness to cultural
influence and variation, Malafouris (2013, pp. 46-47) recasts the Neuroscientific term
‘Metaplasticity’ as referring exclusively to the emergent higher-order properties of
synapse plasticity to more broadly including the extended characteristic of neural
development that constitutes the intertwining embodied mind and material world
through material engagement. Metaplasticity reframed in this way concerns Bthe
mechanisms that mediate these plastic changes, not at the level of the individual, but
at the systemic level of enculturation and social practice^ (p. 49). This recasting of
Metaplasticity takes account of how the human brain is an extremely plastic, and
culturally situated, bio-artefact permeated by history and mediated by material culture.
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Comparing the brain to that of a piece of clay, Malafouris points out that brain is as
much a cultural artefact as it is a biological entity, understood as both an artefact of
culture and a cultural artefact:
BLike any other item of material culture, the human brain and body can be grown
and molded into different styles. Like a piece of clay thrown on the wheel of
culture, the human mind and brain is subject to continuous re-shaping, re-wiring,
and re-modelling (2010, p. 55).
Malafouris (2015) calls for renewed attention upon the continuity of action between
brain, body and material culture, within which material culture itself plays a funda-
mental role in cognitive development. To do so, Malafouris suggests revisiting the
process philosophy of early twentieth century— comprising the work of A.N. White-
head, H. Bergson and J. Dewey — which advocates an organism-environment model
of life that helps to extend a narrow representational view of cognition into a
Btransactional^ process of mutual co-constitution between brain, body and world. Such
ideas help to overcome an inherent limitation to the logic of a passive interaction
between brain body and world as discrete domains and to recognize instead the
dynamic Btransactional^ interplay between them over time. This philosophical frame-
work allows for an understanding of the different forms and properties of this transac-
tional co-constitution of brain, body and world through which we are able to more fully
understand the metaplasticity of the human mind. The challenges of such an endeavor
lie in understanding not only how the metaplasticity of the mind and material culture
should be understood in relation to the changing ecological, social, technological and
environmental contexts that form the historical specificity of cognitive development,
but also how this can be made tangible for empirical analysis.
This paper explores how the historical specificity of the metaplasticity of mind can be
made tangible through the study of material culture. The paper grounds it’s exploration
within the development of enactive accounts of mind applied to the study of material
culture, particularly Material Engagement Theory (MET) (Malafouris 2013), which aim
to better understand the historical specificity of organism-environment coupling and the
development of cognition over time. Within this context, I will explore the particular
activity of painting, and suggest that paintings can give us clues to the historical specificity
of the metaplasticity of mind that crosses the technological, phenomenological, material,
and social conditions underpinning the creation of a mark. I will draw from a range of
sources that have a root within process philosophy; John Dewey (Bentley and Dewey
1949), who pays particular attention to how the material world of matter and the lifeworld
of the embodied subject are correlated at the ontological level, proposing the philosoph-
ical concept of ‘transaction’ between entities rather than that of an ‘interaction’ within
which matter and meaning exchange characteristics over time; and Gilles Deleuze (1981),
who builds a materialist philosophy of painting which promotes the ability of paint to
express the encultured and historical manipulation of it as an expressive material in itself;
an action rendered visible that express the historical emergence of mind.
Through paying attention to the basic visual elements of an image, its quality of line,
composition, thickness of paint, a Deleuzian Phenomenological reading of a work of
visual culture - a modernist painting by Manet c1863 - will be undertaken to uncover
some of the ecological, technological, perceptual and imaginary determinants of the
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period that are rendered visible in the painted marks. Reading the formal characteristic
of a work in this way provides clues as to a historically specific mode of action that is
rendered visible through the marks that are made, giving clues to the changing
technological, perceptual and ecological lifeworld of human action from which the
work is brought into being.
2 Enactive mark-making and painting
Material Engagement Theory (MET) (Malafouris 2008a; Malafouris 2010; Malafouris
2013) has focused attention upon the interrelationships between mind and material
world as can be read through cultural artefacts, its key aim to better understanding the
long-term developmental co-evolution of mind, culture and material world. Informed
by Enactive models of cognition (Varela et al. 1993) MET approaches the study of
material culture as emergent within human activity and aims to provide access to the
metaplasticity of a mind that is coupled to the material world through action. Within the
study of material culture, enactive accounts of practices such as drawing reveal the
constantly changing and developmental relations between form, hands and surface that
result in cultural artefacts, the differences in composition and form over time pointing
to crucial differences in the development of cognition over time.
Studied as a result of relations between hand and surface, depictions are understood
as an enactive sign (Malafouris 2013) that can help us visualize the constitutive
intertwining of cognition, culture and material world. As an enactive sign, mark-
making should be approached not as a passive representational object but rather as
an active prosthetic perceptual means of sense-making,1 created through a technolog-
ically mediated activity of drawing, scraping or engraving as emergent products of the
perceptual dynamics of a non-representational kind. Here, marks are Bmore than the
representational residues of human intentionality […] not a Btrace^ of gesture, but an
actual part of such a gesture in space and time^ (Malafouris 2013, p. 191). Within
MET, the study of mark-making begins not in terms of the final image and what it may
be of or about but in terms of the most basic visual element of the image (pp. 200–201),
the individual stroke itself; the forms contours, and compositions of the lines, which
provide clues as to the tools, gestures, materials and experiences involved in the
generation of the marks themselves.
To help describe the creative activity of material engagement that underpins human
activity, Malafouris (2014) introduces the term thinging to articulate the kind of
cognitive life instantiated in acts of thinking and feeling with, through and about things
in the ‘actual occasion’ of activity. Malafouris’ use of the term thinging aims to retain a
1 In describing drawing as an enactive process, Patricia Cain (2010, p. 55) equally maintains that the final
image created by any process of depiction (what it may appear to represent) is the visible and tangible by-
product of the entire enactive process that produces it. Cain likens drawing to Maturana and Varela’s (1979)
autopoeisis, a system that is brought forth by itself through recursive generation of its own organisation. The
kinds of knowledge and sense-making that emerge through drawing are Bbrought forth through the practi-
tioners own recursive circular patterns of human processes and his or her interactions with the environment^
(Cain 2010, p. 48). Drawing, as an activity, evolves through circular patterns of processes between practi-
tioners and his / her interactions with the world, each mark made emerges through negotiation between
organism and the material world in relation to its own history of development in a processual way (p. 55).
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Heideggarian sense of ‘gathering space and time’ whilst adding a specific focus upon
the kinds of cognitive lives instantiated through thinking with, through and about
material things at different points in space and time (p. 142). Malafouris’ main focus
is with what he terms the hylonoetic field of human becoming; the entwined relation-
ships between mind and matter that results in the creation of material artefacts. To
explore this field, the concept of creative thinging is used specifically to account for the
active participatory process by which things are presented to us through the act of
material engagement, an activity that involves time-varying and culturally specific
bodily techniques which extend to sensory and cognitive domains.
Exploring creative thinging through describing the creative activity of forming a
vase out of clay, Malafouris (pp. 149–150) uses the term to refer to a saturated
entanglement of thinking through and working with materials, exploring creative
activity not as the materialisation, actualisation or externalisation of a performed
creative idea in the head, but rather as the making of the creative idea itself through
action. By looking at the processes responsible for a vase coming to be, Malafouris
describes a feeling of and for clay, a process of becoming attuned to the forces of matter
and form generating skills that require to forms of material consciousness; as a
manifestation of material agency – an awareness of working with a specific form of
Banimate^ or Bvibrant^ matter; and a Btectonic awareness^ that becomes realised
through the harmonious negotiations and improvisations between fingers and material.
These forms of material consciousness are processes of the vase’s creation, and as such
are expressed in the vase as it is made, an expression of the potters encultured and
embodied response to a material at a certain point in time.
This feeling of and for materials that Malafouris describes through clay resonates
with an alchemic theory of painting explored by James Elkins (2000). Elkins builds
alchemic account of oil painting that points to the indissolubility of experience and
matter in a collaboration or co-creation of the marks made. For Elkins the practice is a
negotiation between body, water and stone through which the ongoing dialogue with
the material:
A painting is made of paint—of fluids and stone—and paint has its own logic,
and its own meanings even before it has been shaped into a Madonna. To an
artist, a picture is both a sum of ideas and a blurry memory of ‘pushing paint’,
breathing fumes, dripping oils and wiping brushes, smearing and diluting and
mixing. […] The material memories of a picture—every painting captures a
certain resistance of paint, a prodding gesture of the brush, a speed and insistence
in the face of mindless matter: and it does so at the same moment, and in the same
thought, as it captures the expression of a face (p. 3).
Elkins’ logic of painting is a logic that emerges between painter and material, a
thinking in and through painting as a posed to a thinking about painting. Focusing
attention upon the study of Oil painting, Elkins reads the marks created by a number of
modernist and modern painters in terms of the gestures that make the marks. Reading a
section of a Sessetta (pp. 4–5) he notes how the fine details of the face are created
through slow, careful pleasurable, and repetitious manipulation of droplets of pigment.
This is in stark contrast to the strokes of a Monet (p. 17) within which he finds a
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Btimidity and violence, of perfect control and preparation and perfect abdication of
control in execution^, a stroke that requires real brute force and a highly stretched
canvas to deal with the rough treatment of the paint by the artist. For Ekins, the sum of
the painter’s brush strokes is the evidence of the artist’s manual devotion to the image
responding to the material medium itself as they paint. It records the most delicate
gesture and the most tense, and as an artifact that is Bcast in the mode of the painter’s
movements^ (p. 5) a painting is always a portrait of the painters embodied thinking at
that moment in space and time, a portrait that can be read as evidence of the artist’s
cognitive development rendered tangible through action fixed in paint.
Elkins’ focus upon the indissolubility of embodied experience and matter resonates
with Deleuze’s (1981, Deleuze & Guattari, 2004) philosophy of painting which
explores the ability of paint to express a complex of interwoven forces that cross
human, non-human, material and environmental worlds. Deleuze (1981) explores the
work of Francis Bacon as someone concerned with the expressive materiality of paint
felt as Bsomething deeply alive, to be full of thought and expressive meaning, even
before it is formed into the resemblance of a landscape^ (Ambrose 2006, p. 192).
Deleuze develops a radical materialist philosophy of painting, following Henri Berg-
son, which focusses upon the ontogenesis of forms – the conditions of their becoming –
conditions that cross the personal and subjective as well as the non-human, material and
cosmic forces of the activity. This shift from a hylomorphic to a morphogenetic model
of creativity and life, inspired by Gilbert Simondon, places attention on the laws of Ban
interior to the earth opposed to the laws of its surface^ (Deleuze 2004 p. 7), the
material, environmental, geological, and cosmic conditions that lie under the apparent
fixed and stable surface – or form - of the world.
Deleuze builds a model of an artistic sensation that results in the creation of works as
something more than the internal subjective response to a mechanistic external world,
attesting to the reciprocity of subject and object, the immersion of a body within a
world that is itself volatile and active:
BSensation has one face turned toward the subject (the nervous system, vital
movement, Binstinct,^ Btemperament^) […] and one face turned toward the object
(the Bfact,^ the place, the event). Or rather, it has no faces at all, it is both things
indissolubly, it is being-in-the-world. […] [I]t is the same body which, being both
subject and object, gives and receives the sensation^. (Deleuze 2004, p. 25).
For Deleuze, a painterly model of sensation is a Btelling^ at the level of an organism-
environment coupling (a being-in-and of-the world), an arrest or snapshot of motion in
paint which recompose the movement in all its continuity, speed and violence (p. 29), a
movement Bin place^, which for Bacon referred to Bthe action of invisible forces on the
body^ (p. 30). This moment of sensation has a phenomenological and existential
character referring also to the different sense organs that take part; between colour,
taste, touch smell, noise and weight. The painter, in arresting forces of the cosmos
would do so equally through the character of their own phenomenology, Bmaking
visible^ (p. 30) an original unity of the senses and the forces of the environment acting
upon the body through paint.
For painting (by which Deleuze refers to Modern painting in particular), before any
figural formation there is a material logic at play, a logic of vital matter, a matter charged
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with energy, which he terms a Bmaterial-force^ relation that is rendered visible in paint
along with the gestures of the artist. Deleuze uses Paul Klee’s formula that the task of art is
Bnot to render the visible, but to render visible forces that are not themselves visible^
(1981, p. 40) which Deleuze mobilizes to explore the immersion of the body within an
energetic world – with its own invisible forces – that act upon the body. The forces are a
condition of sensation as Bfor a sensation to exist, a force must be exerted upon the body^
(ibid), the force giving a character to the sensation and the sensation giving a character to
the force. In this way, the task of painting is to paint or ‘capture’ forces (p. 41), to render
visible the invisible forces that constitute the conditions - the ontogenesis - of the painting
itself. It is in this way that Deleuze (p. 42) finds for Cezanne the task of painting was to
render visible the folding force of the mountains, and for Van Gogh it was the capturing of
the unheard-of force of a sunflower seed.
3 A historical specificity to organism-environment coupling
These enactive and materialist accounts of mark-making and painting reveal that to
study depictions and paintings in terms of the gestures and movements that render the
line, rather than what it may depict, gives clues to the cognitive development of the
human mind that is shaped by the material world; a creative thinging that is brought
about through paint. What is also clear from these approaches is that to include the
material world into the cognitive equation, we cannot just insert material properties of
things, there is a historical specificity to matter itself. Elkins (2000, p. 93) draws our
attention to an important aspect of this historicity, regarding painting, that the naming of
commercially mixed colours used in the more recent work of a Pollock may look
similar to those of the eighteenth century, but due to their alchemic production using
metals and stone would have been named and would have meant differently, resulting
in very different interactions and experiences with the materials themselves, there is no
Alchemic significance in Pollock as there would have been in the eighteenth century.
To insert the ‘matter’ of material culture— the oils of the painting— into the study of
development of cognition over time, we have to equally pay attention to the character
of the material world in terms of how it means in relation to the embodied practitioner,
their abilities, philosophies, shared beliefs and experiences at that particular point in
history and geographical location.
The broader context of enactive organism and environment coupling provides a
philosophical framework to investigate the historical contingency of mind and matter
within the context of MET; the extent to which mind and material world are recipro-
cally co-constituted at the ontological level. Evan Thompson (2010) summarises Varela
and Maturana’s Enactive model of life focussing upon the reciprocity of environment
and organism when he describes their co-constitutive relationship:
Like two partners in a dance who bring forth each other's movements, organism
and environment enact each other through their structural coupling. Given this
view of organism-environment co-determination, it follows that evolution should
not be described as a process whereby organisms get better and better at adapting
to the design problems posed by an independent environment [...] (Thompson
2010, p. 204).
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Just as much as the brain-body-world interact through activity, organism and environ-
ment co-constitute each other through action at the ontological level, and continue to
reconfigure each other through further action over a history of structural coupling.
Varela’s conception of the organism-environment coupling is inspired by the existential
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, which he quotes at length:
The properties of the object and the intentions of the subject ... are not only
intermingled: they constitute a new whole. When the eye and the ear follow an
animal in flight, it is impossible to say ‘which started first’ in the exchange of
stimuli and responses. (Merleau-Ponty, cited in Varela et al. 1993, p. 174).
This intermingling of properties and intentions (or world and lived-experience)
enacts a new ‘whole’ that constitutes an organism’s environment – consisting of what
Varela terms ‘features’ of an organisms’ particular environment (Varela et al. 1993).
What an organism perceives is not extracted from a pre-existing world, but are rather
B(virtual) ‘features’ of the world which are enacted by the perceptual guidance of
action^. It is upon this premise that we can understand Varela and Maturana’s
(Maturana and Varela 1998) decision to illustrate their model of life through the
depiction of a lizard (Fig. 1) who’s own tail forms the root of the branch of a tree that
itself comprises the organism’s environment, its source of nourishment, and its dwell-
ing. Such an illustration reveals the extent to which organism and environment are
coupled at the ontological level. As much as we may attend to the interaction between
brain-body-world to understand cognitive human becoming, we could equally attend to
how the world is brought forth in relation to a lived experience of the organism.
4 from interaction to transaction
Inherent within Varela and Maturana’s writing is an organism-environment model of
life that rejects a hard subject / object dualism, bringing into question the use of the
Fig. 1 An Organism-Environment coupling model of life
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term ‘Interact’ – as two pre-defined entities coming together - to adequately describe
the causal relationships between entities. John Dewey (Bentley and Dewey 1949)
outlined this contention in Knowing and the Known where he rejects the widely held
atomistic premise by which we can conceive of entities in any exchange which are fully
formed prior to their interactions, and are not significantly affected by those interac-
tions. The term ‘Interact, he argues, Bassumes the organism and its environmental
objects as substantially separate existences or forms of existence^. (p. 114) In contrast
Dewey proposes an account of reality in which dynamic entities are continually
undergoing reconstitution through co- constitutive relation with others, reminding us
of how, BOrganisms do not live without air and water, nor without food ingestion and
radiation. Entities live as much in processes across and through their perceived ‘skins’
or boundaries, as much as within them.^ (p. 128). To replace ‘interact’, Dewey suggests
the term ‘Transact’, which allows for a co-constitutive exchange between dynamic
entities that comprise organisms and their environments. As Sullivan (2001: 14) has
noted, to understand things as ‘transactional’, Bis to understand both as neither
completely different and separate nor as completely the same and merged into one.
Rather, it is to understand them as formed through a constitutive back and forth
between each other.^
If we are, following Dewey’s lead, to take account of matter’s ‘dynamism’ in
understanding cultural activities over time, we should ask how matter is constituted
not as inter-actional, but as transactional with human activities as well as other entities,
which requires a subtler and less brute-ish approach to understanding matter itself.
Elizabeth Grosz (1999) reminds us that matter is not to be thought of as an irreducible
essence that endures unchanged, rather what endures is the morphogenesis and varia-
tion of matter over time in relation to other entities. Matter is historically contingent and
plural, meaning and matter are always fused at the ontological level — Matter ‘Mat-
ters’, as the Posthumanist theorist Karen Barad (1997) has argued:
Matter and meaning are not separate elements. They are inextricably fused
together, and no event, no matter how energetic, can tear them asunder [...]
matter and meaning cannot be dissociated, not by chemical processing, or
centrifuge, or nuclear blast. Mattering is simultaneously a matter of substance
and significance, (1997, p. 3).
For Barad, following the quantum theory of Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg, an
inseparability of observer and observed, of substance and significance, inspires her
non-representational shift from the ‘properties’ of matter to what she terms ‘phenom-
ena’. For Barad, the primary epistemological unit of all observation is not that of an
independent world of objects with inherent boundaries and fixed properties which mark
out a separation between subject and object, but rather ‘phenomena’ which Bmark the
epistemological inseparability of Bobserver^ and Bobserved^; rather, phenomena are
the ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting Bcomponents.^ (2003, p. 815).
Barad’s phenomena are ontologically primitive relations—relations without preexisting
relata— but rather always defined in relation to the observer and mode of observation.
Within Barad’s performative ontology, matter is not stable, it is always relational to the
plurality of entities that surround it at any one moment in time; matter is historically
contingent; mattering at that point in time differently to another.
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5 From Transaction to Correspondence
The recognition that mattermatters and the inseparability of observer and observed that
Barad’s perfomative ontology calls for aligns with the earlier sentiments of the Ecol-
ogist Jakub von Uexkull (1934) who formulated a theory of meaning that is rooted
within the co-constitution of an organism’s lived-experience and their environment
through his notion of ‘Umwelt’ – the lifeworld of an organism. Extending the Roman-
ticism of Goethe, Uexkull builds what he terms a compositional theory on nature in
which organism and environment do not inter-act with each other as separate, pre-
defined entities, but rather run ‘counterpoint’ to each other at the ontological level. He
gives us an example of a flower and a bee:
Were the flower not beelike And were the bee not flowerlike,. The consonance
could never work.
Were the eye not sunlike, It could not gaze upon the sun.
Were the sun not eyelike, It could not shine in any sky.
The sun is a light in the sky. The sky is, however, a product of the eye, which
constructs here its farthest plane, which includes all of the environmental space.
Eyeless living beings know neither a sky nor a sun ([1934] 2010, p. 190).
For Uexkull, any object that enters into relation with the life-world of an animal,
human or insect undergoes a change in its hierarchy of properties— bringing into play
and putting out of play certain properties in relation to the what is possible for that
organism to perceive – taking on what he calls a ‘meaning tone’. Using the illustrations
of Franz Huth to read such ‘meaning tones’ Uexkull describes how an oak tree changes
in the life-worlds of certain animals and humans; in the rational world of the forester,
who must determine which trunks are ready to be felled, the oak is no more than a few
cords of wood – taking on a ‘use tone’. The same oak in the magical environment of a
little girl takes on a ‘danger tone’ – the wicked face has turned the oak into a dangerous
demon. For a fox, the oak possesses neither the use tone of the forester’s environment
nor the danger tone of the girl’s environment, but a ‘protection tone’. For the squirrel,
the oak, with its many branches takes on a ‘climbing tone’. In the ant’s environment the
rest of the oak disappears behind its furrowed bark, whose peaks and valleys form the
ants’ hunting ground.
Uexkull draws our attention to how all matter is pluralistic in that is has a contin-
gency to the many life-worlds in which it is perceived at any one time. As matter has
this kind of variation within different life-words at any one moment, it follows that the
properties of matter are not fixed, they are rather Bnothing other than the perception
signs [meaning tones] imprinted upon them by the subject with which they enter into a
relation^ ([1934], 2010, p. 201). Uexkull takes this co-constitution of subject and object
right down to the atomic level suggesting that Ball properties of things, even when we
analyze them down to the smallest details –atoms and electrons – will always remain
only perception marks of our senses and ideas (p. 207). The tree is much more than its
physical properties as a tree in the world of a certain human observer, it is the
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accumulation of the meaning tones of all kinds of human that can perceive it, as well as
all animals and insects, at that particular moment in time.
The much more that Uexkull describes finds resonance with a recent re-appraisal of
James Gibson’s (1979) notion of affordance within ecological psychology. Diverging
from a formal definition of affordance (Turvey 1992) as a dispositional property of the
environment which becomes available in some specific circumstances for a specific
organism, Stoffregen (2003) recasts the terms as an emergent property of an animal-
environment system considered as a whole which does not inhere in either the
environment or the animal. Chemero (2003) takes this one step further and suggests
that affordances are not properties of any one entity but rather more usefully understood
as relations between particular aspects of an organism and a particular aspects of the
environment; emergent relations that change depending upon organism-environment
relations. Where a tree in the life-world of an ant affords shelter this affordance is not
inherent within the tree to be ‘picked up’ by the ant as an apriori property, it is rather an
emergent relation that takes on certain characteristics of the tree and the cognitive life of
the ant.
Uexkull’s notion of counterpoint provide a useful way of approaching the study of
material culture as an archaeological trace of a specific counterpoint that runs between
organism and environment; the ways in which an artefacts form — much like that of
the bee and the flower — expresses a consonance between human and environmental
worlds. Ingold (2013) offers an example to begin to read how the kinaesthetic (human),
material and environmental worlds ‘correspond’, and are made readable through the
form of artefacts such as kites and pots. Rather than approach the study of material
culture through the notion of an inter-action of pre-defined domains of object, envi-
ronments and humans, Ingold suggests that we think of it as a temporal ‘correspon-
dence’– a spiral interlacing of all three worlds whose form gravitate around each other.
For Ingold the current appeal to an ‘object agency’ within the study of material
culture tends to arrive at a materialism that is tied to physical properties of a world
already cast, or pre-formed, prior to human engagement and as such does not ade-
quately describe the meaningful correspondence between the world of human experi-
ence, objects, and environmental conditions. Ingold offers an example of how to
address this ‘objectness’ through the example of flying a kite, a kite-flyer’s inter-
action with the air is not so much a ‘dance of agency’ — an inter-action between the
pre-existing agents of flyer, kite and air— it is more like a dance of ‘animacy’; the kite
flies because it’s very material form expresses a correspondence between kinesthetic,
material and environmental worlds:
[F]lyer and air do not so much interact as correspond. The kite, in effect, sets up a
correspondence between the animate [kinesthetic] movements of the flyer and the
currents of the aerial medium in which he or she is immersed. It is not that you
need air to interact with a kite; rather, you need a kite to correspond to the air
(Ingold 2013, p, 100).
Following Ingold’s logic leads to the premise that any variations in the material form
of the kite over time – the differences in it’s formal structure- can be said to express an
historically contingent correspondence between cognitive, artefactual and environmen-
tal worlds. The form of the kite, if studied as an archaeological trace of everything that
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is happening around it that allows it to be a kite, expresses a correspondence between
body, environment and air – a mattering - captured in the form of the kite itself. Tracing
the changing formal structures of kites over time and geographical location can tell us
the story of the kite-within-its-environment; of the kinaesthetic movements of the kite
flyer (informed by their lived history of experience), the kite itself, the string the binds
the kite to the flyer, the air currents that push the kite around the sky, the trees and
structures that disrupt the air flow, the grass that slows the human runner, and much
more. In this way, all Human artefacts, in some way, express an historically contingent
correspondence between Phenomenal, Environmental and Material worlds expressed
through their formal structure. The archaeological study of the variation of the form of
cultural artefacts over space and time allow empirical access to this contingency.
6 Metaplasticity rendered visible in paint
As Elkins’ (2000) alchemic reading of Oil painting revealed, a painting is always a
portrait of the painters embodied thinking at that moment in space and time, a
portrait that can be read as evidence of the artist’s cognitive development rendered
tangible through action fixed in paint, what Malaforis (2014) has described as
thinging, the cognitive feeling for and though paint. The material memories of a
picture capture a certain resistance of paint, a gesture of the brush, the fumes of the
paint and other studio environmental details, a speed and insistence at the same
moment, and in the same thought, as it captures the expression of a face being
depicted. The archaeological reading of the formal structure of human artefacts
gleaned from the work of Ingold can be applied to artefacts of visual culture to read
the historically contingent correspondences between cognitive, environmental and
material worlds that may be expressed through their formal characteristics. Such an
analysis can give us clues as to the lifeworld of the painter at that particular point in
time, an historical specificity to the metaplasticity of mind being rendered visible in
paint.
As a case study I will use an example drawn from art history, an oil painting by
Manet, The Luncheon on the Grass (c1863), which makes for a pertinent case study as,
firstly, it has a wealth of art historical scholarship that focuses upon the meaning of its
stylistic traits in terms of what is depicted and its socio-political contexts (Bataille 1955;
Fried 1996), but less so in terms of the materiality of paint and it’s the perceptual /
cognitive dimensions. Secondly, the group of sitters at the center of the composition are
a re-appearance of a group of river gods taken from Marcantonio Raimondi’s earlier
engraving of the Judgment of Paris (c1510–1520) which themselves can be traced back
to an engraving on a Roman sarcophagus depicting the Judgment of Paris from the
third century AD (Fig. 2). The endurance of the sitters across these works provides
stark formal and compositional differences that were created over temporal and geo-
graphical locations, differences which provide clues to the historical specificity of the
lifeworld of the painter through which we can uncover some of the ecological,
technological, perceptual and imaginary determinants of the period that are rendered
visible in the painted marks.
Where this particular painting has been discussed in relation to the stylistic
details of the human figures and their political, sociocultural contexts, I will focus
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upon the— often overlooked— environmental details that are rendered differently
to those of the figures; the presentation of the ground and the background details
within which the figures sit, as an expression of how the ground itself ‘mattered’
within this particular spatio-temporal location of a nineteenth century Europe. This
analysis will follow the materialist (Elkins 2000) and enactive (Cain, 2010;
Malafouris 2013) readings of depiction surveyed earlier, and begin from the manner
in which the ground is depicted focusing upon the most basic visual element of the
stroke itself. The forms contours, compositions of the lines, thickness of paint all
provide clues to cognitive development of the creator that include the material
engagement of the tools, gestures, materials, experiences and lifeworlds involved,
rendered visible through the very generation of the marks.
6.1 How the ground ‘matters’
Paul Crowther (2012, pp. 63-65) has undertaken a Deleuzian phenomenological
analysis of this work through which he attends to the gestures of the artist as they are
rendered visible in the materiality of paint, reading the work itself in terms of the
gestures and movements of the body that created it. In doing so, Crowther (p. 63)
departs from well versed narratives of the scandal the work may or may not have
caused due to its juxtaposition of naked and semi-dressed women with that of two
dressed men, as well as it’s expressionistic rejection of academic painting’s historical
and classical modes of representation. and focuses upon other material factors
pertaining to the formal composition itself.
Fig. 2 The stylistic reformulation of a group of river gods: (top left) The Judgment of Paris (detail of a Roman
sarcophagi,Villa Medici, 2nd-third century AD); (top right) The Judgment of Paris by Marcantonio Raimoni
(c1510–1520); (bottom) The Luncheon on the Grass by Édouard Manet (c1863) (Warburg, cited in Gombrich
1970, pp. 276–267)
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Crowther particularly notes how the painting does not conceal the
brushstrokes by which it brings about objects, motifs and other representational
content, in some areas the work itself appears unfinished — particularly so with
the background details — through which the work emphasizes the emergent of
figure from a material ground of paint, the figures ontogenesis. The background
and foreground details of the flora and fauna are painted with thick, rushed brush
strokes in comparison to that of the human figures which are more considered
and detailed, they appear unfinished and ambiguous in relation to the more
detailed recognizable human figures seated in the center of the composition.
The pictorial depth is also flattened — especially in comparison to traditional
compositions of painting and of those of his period2 — a compressed pictorial
plane upon which the figures all appear to be placed, even though one is in the
distance, reducing the illusion of depth that is created through classical linear
perspective.
In comparison, Raimondi’s earlier depiction of The Judgement of Paris, the
sitters (here a group of river gods) are sat to the right of the composition, next to a
river, watching the goings on at Mount Olympus which are the subject matter of
the etching. The background details of the etching are presented in the same level
of detail to that of the sitters themselves, with grasses, reeds, trees, rocks and soil
presented in a rich detail. There is a sense of depth of field within the work with
the characters and foreground scenery depicted with finer detail than those further
away from the viewer. Within The Luncheon on the Grass, the group of human
figures sit within the centre of the composition — brought centre stage — upon a
background and foreground that is rendered through thick, rushed brush strokes,
and in places remains unfinished in relation to the more detailed recognisable
human figures seated in the centre of the composition. Manet’s composition is
flattened, reducing the illusion of depth, compressing the pictorial planes in which
the figures appear to sit upon the same plane as the background.
To account for this emphasis toward flatness and the ambiguous and unfinished
presentation of the ground Crowther aligns the work with a key feature of
nineteenth century continental phenomenology regarding the ontological reciproc-
ity of subject and object of experience that he finds within the Vitalist Philosophy
of Henri Bergson. This lineage holds that the ontological relation between subject
and object of experience is not passively given to each other, but rather a
reciprocal interaction and modification, which Crowther suggests guides
nineteenth-century art of this kind (p. 59). For Crowther (p. 65), the particular
compositional choice by Manet to represent the ground in an ambiguous, quickly
passed over and unfinished manner was used to draw the viewers’ attention to the
2 It is important to take account of how these details may be experienced differently today than they would
have during Manet’s time. When looking at this work having experienced the flatter works of later modernism,
we may not experience the ‘flatness’ or the ‘ambiguity’ that those of the 1850’s may have. Hamilton (1969)
has noted how Bwe may read these outlined shapes as three-dimensional form without difficulty, in 1865 to
eyes so long accustomed to more complex and gradual transitions from light to dark, [these works by Manet]
would have looked like an arrangement of flat patterns lacking the depth and three-dimensionality needed in
such elaborate compositions.^
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group of sitters, and to attend to their postures, faces and gazes,3 of which one is
directly addressing the viewer as if they are a part of the composition itself — a
direct address that reinforces the reciprocal relation between that which is seen
and the one who sees it.
Crowther’s reading remains focused upon the relationship between humans and
other humans, whether painted or real, the unfinished ground upon which they sit
serving the, somewhat passive, purpose of drawing attention back to the human
exchange of gaze. This particular treatment of the ground, however, may offer clues
as to another way in which the ground ‘meant’ at that particular point in time across
Europe, which we find a logic for within Deleuze’s philosophy. Focussing upon the
particular move to abstraction, Deleuze aligned modern art and vitalist philosophy upon
the challenge of renouncing the domain of representation and taking up instead the
conditions of representation as their very object of study (Smith 1997, p. 41). For
Deleuze, late nineteenth and early twentieth century painting can be read as aiming not
at the reproduction of visible forms, but rather at the Bcapturing^ of non-visible forces
that act beneath forms, the task of all painting becoming Bto make new forces visible, to
formulate the problems they pose, and incite […] an experimental activity of thinking
around them^ (Ambrose 2006, p. 196). Seen in this light, the rejection of classical
realist modes of representation and the move toward abstraction— particularly that of
the emergence of objects from a material ground of paint emphasizing the material
conditions — that we find in Manet’s treatment of the background and foreground
details begins to exhibit these signs of a philosophical attempt to ‘get at’ or explore the
new ontogenetic conditions that lie beneath the very surface of reality that amounts to
the recognition of the embeddedness of human life within a vital and energetic material
world.
The kind of ontogenetic conditions that this formal treatment may be ‘getting at’
reveal themselves through surveying the wider philosophical context of the period.
There is an important shift in the theory of causation that occurred during the nineteenth
century between Raimondi’s engraving and Manet’s painting that begins to reveal a
geological determinant to the nature of the representational treatment of the ground.
Studying the re-emergence of this particular group of figures, Aby Warburg notes how
Manet’s depiction was created amidst the gradual emergence of the laws of natural
science that was brought about by a secularized Europe gradually sterilizing the divine
ruling of earthly events by the gods. He states that between the depictions within the
Judgement of Paris and the Luncheon on the Grass:
[...] mankind witnessed the decisive change in the theory of causation relating to
the basic phenomena of nature. The idea of an immanent and impersonal law
3 Crowther’s focus upon the stylistic depiction of the human bodies follows an art historical tendency of those
who have discussed the stylistic shifts within Manet’s work as a part of a modernist regime of spectatorship
and subjectivity. Such narratives focus attention upon the presentation of certain details of the human figures,
the careful presentation of face, hands and other body parts as Bpar excellence the substance of expression of
the signifier^ (Crary 1992, pp. 92–112) of Manet’s modernism. Crary’s reasoning is informed by the important
work undertaken within Charles Darwin’s (1872) The Expression of Emotions in Men and Animals which
analysed the psychological state of an organism expressed through anatomical and physiological functioning.
The face, hands, eyes and the posture of the human body within the work of Manet, Crary argues, are of
significant meaning in this regard, being a sign of the continuum between the somatic and social (p. 99).
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ruling natural events sweeps the whole haggling governing body with its all-too-
human foibles from the heavens. ... the major Olympic divinities have ceased to
be the subject of active sacrificial rituals since they have been archaeologically
sterilized. (Warburg, cited in Gombrich 1970, pp. 276-267).
One important replacement for the divine model of causation was the gradual discovery
of a ‘deep geological time’ to the earth; a self-organising model of the earth promoted
by the work of James Hutton and George Lyell who’s development ran much deeper
than that of the biblical timescale. This discovery ‘sterilized’ the gods of their stake in
natural events within the geological imagination, Geology was no longer the mechan-
ical play thing of a vengeful Christian God with earthquakes being the result of temper
of a vengeance as theorised in Reverend Stukeley’s Theory of Earthquakes (1777), it
had its own deeper history of non-linear development free of any theological dogma,
with its own metaphysics of self-organisation; geological uplift, thermodynamics and
morphogenetics with no beginning or end.
Stephen Jay Gould (1988, pp. 61–63) has described the impact Hutton’s Theory of
the Earth (1777) had within British Geological thought during the eighteenth and
nineteenth century. Hutton postulated that the history of the earth includes three cycles
of deposition, uplift and repair – the complex panorama of history that can be inferred
from the observation of the simple geometry of horizontal strata above vertical. What
Gould makes clear is that Hutton’s ideas brought about a revolutionary shift in the
metaphors used to conceive of and think about the timescale of the earth itself, the earth
does not follow a mechanical arrow of time set in place by an origin point from a
creator that will lead to inevitable erosions, but rather follows numerous cycles of
decay, repair and uplift. The Earth, as Hutton declared, has Bno vestiges of a beginning,
–no prospect of an end^, but is rather self-organising based upon a geological causality.
The frontispiece (Fig. 3) of Hutton’s (1777) Theory of the Earth depicts a drastic
change in the sense of the role and scale of humanity itself as a part of the emerging
‘deep time revolution’ of the nineteenth century. The artist, John Clerk of Eldin, chose
Fig. 3 John Clerk of Eldin’s engraving of Hutton’s ‘Uncomformity’
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to compose the space of the engraving as dominated by Hutton’s horizontal and Vertical
strata upon which tiny humans on horse and carriage go about their daily routines upon
the thin crust of Hutton’s vast ‘Machine without a history’. Hutton’s self-organising
model of geological causality emerged alongside a drastic change in the sense of the
role and scale of humanity itself as a part of a ‘deep time revolution’ of the nineteenth
century unifying Geological and Biological timescales. As Shryock and Smail (2011)
have suggested, the emergence of deep geological time co-incised with that of Charles
Darwin’s (1859) On the Origin of Species which brought with it an imaginary in which
the human’s role was no longer seen as essential and permanent, the origins of
humanity itself had a deep time, a much deeper relation to the living, dangerous and
energetic environment in which it are situated, a geological timescale that had an
unknown history, unknown determinants and unknown implications for humanity.
The gradual realisation of unknown and indeterminate origins of a unified geological
and human timescale during the late nineteenth century – the sterilization of divine
causality - we can find expressed within the formal composition of the ground within
Manet’s Luncheon on the Grass, a composition which aimed to not represent the
subject matter - the ground - but rather to sincerely express the artist’s sensation within
the world. Manet’s generation of European painters were indifferent to how important
the subject matter of a painting may be, the purpose of the art of Manet, Barasch
(1998), suggests, was that B[t]he artist does not say today, ‘Come and see faultless
works’, but ‘Come and see sincere works’^ (p. 48). Barasch (pp. 48–49) notes how
around the middle of the nineteenth century, the artistic concept of sincerity within
painting acquired a different connotation to its earlier Romantic notion, focusing upon
the extent to which the artist may be moved by what they were relating, by moving
away from the idealization of reality that was being painted, painting should search for
truth, and be truthful in its representation of reality. This truth was not that of a
Renaissance truth – scientifically correct – but rather a truth of reality Bnot
embellished^ by interposing inherited cultural patterns of the past. By sincerity,
Barasch (p.50) suggests Manet means Bthat the sensual impression should be
reproduced on canvas without the artist’s ideology and education transferring with
what he perceived^.
Within the context of Deleuze’s account of artistic sensation – that attests to the
immersion of a body within an affective and energetic material world – the minimizing
of the importance of subject matter, the move to abstraction, the ‘sterilization’ of the
ground, the focus upon ‘how’ the subject matter is depicted, suggest that the unfinished
and rushed brush strokes that Manet uses to depict the ground in Luncheon on the Grass
was a way of getting to the sensation of how the groundmattered at that particular point in
time. The subject matter is the sense impressions of the artist, sense impressions that
obtain a character from the forces of the ground itself (geological deep time) that penetrate
the body of the artist ‘captured’ in the brush strokes themselves; how the ground is
depicted expressing a growing sense of an unknown emerging deep human history.
The revealing of the brush-strokes to present some background details such as trees
and other flora and fauna expresses an unfinished character to their form and empha-
sizes the emergence of figure from their material ground of paint and canvas, an
emphasis that echoes the revealing of new origins of biological time from a material
ground of deep geological time. The partially indeterminate presentation of these very
unfinished background details in relation to the more realistic and detailed presentation
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of human figures corresponds to the emerging sense of unknown human origins within
the deep time of a geological environment that is itself unpredictable, harsh and not yet
fully known or realised. This is emphasized more through the flattening of the depth of
field, the appearance of the figures and the background as being upon a single plane,
emphasizes the shared origins of human and geological deep time, the fusing of
biological and geological timescales, both emerging from the same flat ground of paint
and canvas.
7 Conclusions
The formal characteristics and details of a work such as Manet’s Luncheon on the
Grass read not as an intentional representation of the ground by the artist, but as an
expression of how the ground mattered, at this particular period of time, provide some
clues to better understanding the historical specificity of the relations between mind and
matter within the lifeworld of the artist Manet. The compositional choices made to
render the subject matter of the ground across the three artefacts discussed above are an
expression of the very historical contingency of mind-matter relations themselves; a
matter of substance and significance in equal measures that changes in relation to
technological, ecological and philosophical contexts. This mattering provides clues to
some of the characteristics of the historical specificity of the metaplasticity of the minds
architecture and development as coupled to the material world, extending not only
through technologies of the period and through the very materials of paint, brush and
canvas being used, but also into the very geological time of the earth itself to which the
biological time of the human body is coupled.
What Malafouris (2015) has highlighted as the historical specificity of the
metaplasticity of mind extending into constantly changing technological, material,
ecological and social contexts, asks us to re-appraise the interrelations between mind
and matter in the study of the development of human cognition over time. This
interrelationship between mind and matter is usefully understand as a kind of
‘mattering’ (Barad 2003); how the material world means in correspondence to a
specific lifeworld of human activity, rather than through the insertion of fixed material
properties into the development of cognition. This mattering is rendered tangible for
analysis within cultural artefacts, through a process of feeling (and thinking) for and
through materials over time, a creative thinging (Malafouris, 204) that manifests the
emergence of an idea, or thinking with materials and tools, visible for analysis.
In facing the challenges of studying the complex historical specificity of cognitive
development within the study of material culture (Malafouris 2015; Shryock and Smail,
2011) a ‘transactional’ account of organism-environment coupling and meaning offer a
framework within which the technological, ecological, philosophical and socio-cultural
context of this development can be made tangible for empirical analysis within cultural
artefacts. Through asking how matter ‘matters’ within the context of an organism-
environment system, the study of mark-making, beginning with most basic visual
element of the image; the forms contours, and compositions of the lines, providing
clues to the tools, gestures, materials and experiences involved in the generation of the
marks themselves, can be read as a ‘capturing’ of mattering rendered visible within the
marks made.
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The materialist philosophy of Deleuze (1981) provides a strong guiding principle in
which he argues we can learn much from the painters and from painting regarding the
ontogenesis of forms, both in terms of their sensitivity to and practice of ‘capturing’ the
conditions of the emergence of form attesting to the immersion of lived (and living)
body within an equally energetic and responsive material world. What Deleuze’s
lineage of thinking offers the study of material culture and the study of cognition is
an insight that what is depicted – the image – can be read as the ‘capturing’ of the
liveliness of the lived body locked in a dance with the liveliness of the medium and
tools being used within the context in which it is being created. A body that pushes oil
paint around the canvas at the same time as the paint itself pushes back all happening as
the painter renders the expression of a face, tree or blade of grass at a certain moment in
technological, philosophical and socio-cultural history. What is depicted – the motif,
subject matter, or line – has the potential to express how the object being depicted may
have meant that that point in time, an expression through which an archaeological
analysis with the sensitivity and affinity of that of a painter with their materials may
discover important clues.
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